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An employer's good faith mistake is no defense to liability
if the employee's organizing activity falls within the pro-
tective zone of the National Labor Relations Act.
S ECTION 158(a)(3) OF THE NationalLabor Relations Act ("Act")
makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer "by discrimination in re-
gard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organiza-
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is derived from a chapter in the authors' book,
LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (ALI-ABA, Philadelphia, 2d ed.
1986).
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tion." (Unless otherwise indicated, all
section references will be to the Act as
codified in 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq.)
Provisos to section 158(a)(3) permit
an employer to enter into a union
shop agreement with the union and
thereby to discriminate against an em-
ployee who will not pay periodic
union dues and initiation fees. Section
158(b)(2) of the Code is a corollary to
section 158(a)(3). It prohibits unions
from causing or attempting to cause
an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of section
158(a)(3).
It is essential to distinguish the ele-
ments of a section 158(a)(3) violation
from those constituting a section
158(a)(1) violation. Section 158(a)(1)
protects the exercise of section 157
rights - engaging in concerted activi-
ties for mutual aid or protection -
even if no union is involved. Gener-
ally, in cases involving section. 158-
(a)(1), employer motivation is irrele-
vant. If, for example, an employer
knows that an employee has engaged
in protected activity and mistakenly,
but in good faith, believes that the
employee has been guilty of miscon-
duct justifying discharge, such as
threatening to dynamite company
premises, it is nonetheless unlawful
under section 158(a)(1) for the em-
ployer to fire the employee because of
the alleged misconduct. NLRB v.
Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21
(1964). The Court in Burnup & Sims
reasoned that:
9 Protected activity would have pre-
carious status if innocent employees
engaging in it could be discharged;
e Their discharge on false charges,
even in good faith, could have a deter-
rent effect on other employees; and
* "It is the tendency of those dis-
charges to weaken or destroy the sec-
tion 158(a)(1) right that is control-
ling." Id. at 23-24.
The normal order of proof is that
the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board ("Board")
first shows that at the time of dis-
charge the employee was engaged in
protected activity and the employer
knew it. The burden then shifts to the
employer to show an "honest belief"
the employee engaged in misconduct
and, for that reason, was discharged.
The burden then shifts to the General
Counsel to show the employee did not
engage in the conduct alleged or that
it was protected. Gen. Tel. Co., 251
N.L.R.B. 737 (1980), aff'd, 109
LRRM 2360 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
In contrast, section 158(a)(3) has a
different reach: Proof of violation re-
quires a showing of both discrimina-
tion and encouragement or discour-
agement of union membership. The
relationship of these elements was
succinctly stated in Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-43
(1954). Section 158(a)(3) "does not
outlaw all encouragement or discour-
agement of membership in labor or-
ganizations; only such as is accom-
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plished by discrimination is prohib-
ited. Nor does this section outlaw dis-
crimination in employment as such;
only such discrimination as encour-
ages or discourages membership in a
labor organization is proscribed."
E NCOURAGING OR DISCOURAGING
UNION MEMBERSHIP e Funda-
mental to understanding section
158(a)(3) is understanding its concept
of discrimination. See Teamsters Lo-
cal 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675
(1961) (section 158(a)(3) violation re-
quires existence of "the kind of dis-
crimination to which the Act is ad-
dressed"). First, section 158(a)(3)
discrimination is not limited to dis-
parate treatment but includes the
broader concept of adverse action
taken against one or more employees.
See Midstate Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 706
E2d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 1983). Second,
the adverse action contemplated in-
cludes not only hiring and layoff deci-
sions and the normal forms of disci-
pline, such as discharge, suspension,
and demotion, but also action ad-
versely affecting any term or condi-
tion of employment. See, e.g., Union
Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657
(6th Cir. 1983); Champion Parts Re-
builders, Inc., Northeast Div. v.
NLRB, 717 E2d 845 (3rd Cir. 1983).
The Importance of Motive
Most importantly, the discrimina-
tion prohibited by section 158(a)(3) is
a motive-based concept. It is limited
to those adverse actions taken because
employees engaged in concerted ac-
tivities protected by section 157. This
motive limitation in the section 158-
(a)(3) concept of "discrimination" is
often referred to as adverse action
based in whole or in part on antiunion
animus. The Supreme Court, more
precisely defining the motive element,
has adopted the Board's articulation:
A finding of discrimination requires
proof that "the employee's protected
conduct was a substantial or motivat-
ing factor in the adverse action."
NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp.,
462 U.S. 393 (1983).
Intending the
Foreseeable Consequences
As noted, "only such discrimina-
tion as encourages or discourages
membership in a labor organization is
proscribed." Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954). The
Supreme Court has explained that
discouraging "'membership in [a] la-
bor organization' . . . includes dis-
couraging participation in concerted
activities . . . such as a legitimate
strike." NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963). See Am.
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
300, 313 (1965) ("union membership"
not to be discouraged includes partici-
pation in protected union activities).
In most cases, this element of section
158(a)(3) does not control the out-
come because specific evidence of in-
tent to encourage or discourage is not
an indispensable element of proof. If
"a natural and foreseeable conse-
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quence" of an employer's discrimina-
tion is encouragement or discourage-
ment, it "must be presumed" that the
employer intended such consequence.
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. at 52. Since a "natural and fore-
seeable consequence" of "discrimina-
tion," properly understood as adverse
action taken because employees en-
gaged in protected conduct, will nor-
mally discourage that protected con-
duct, most section 158(a)(3) cases turn
on a single issue: whether protected
conduct was a substantial or motivat-
ing factor in the employer's adverse
action.
Burden of Proof
The Board's General Counsel bears
the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the em-
ployee's protected conduct was a sub-
stantial or motivating factor in an
employer's adverse action. This proof
constitutes a prima facie case of viola-
tion. If the employer presents no evi-
dence to rebut or if the reasons an em-
ployer proffers to explain the adverse
action are rejected as pretextual, the
prima facie case is a sufficient basis
for a violation without further in-
quiry. See NLRB v. Townsend & Bot-
tum, Inc., 722 E2d 297 (6th Cir.
1983); Champion Parts Rebuilders,
Inc. Northeast Div. v. NLRB, 717
E2d 845, 853 (3d Cir. 1983).
Mixed Motive Cases
Often, however, an employer will
offer evidence of lawful motive that
cannot be rejected as pretextual but is
insufficient to rebut the General
Counsel's proof that the employee's
protected conduct was a substantial
or motivating factor in the adverse
action. These are referred to as mixed
motive cases. The employer in these
circumstances can avoid being held in
violation of section 158(a)(3) by prov-
ing by a preponderence of the evi-
dence, as an affirmative defense, that
the adverse action also rested on some
legitimate business justification and
that the adverse action would have
been taken independently of the em-
ployee's protected conduct. NLRB v.
Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S.
393, 401 (1983) (upholding the
Board's position advanced first in
Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083
(1980), 662 E2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S 989 (1982) and
ruling that the Code permits "placing
the burden on the employer to prove
that absent the improper motivation
he would have acted in the same
manner for wholly legitimate rea-
sons").
Courts of appeals have ruled that
the employer's burden in mixed mo-
tive cases is to prove that on the day
the adverse action occurred, it would
have been taken irrespective of the
employee's protected conduct and
not that it could have been taken for
legitimate reasons. Presbyterian/St.
Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 723
E2d 1468, 1479 (10th Cir. 1983); Bos-
ton Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 692
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F2d 169, 171 (lst Cir. 1982); see also
Keeler Corp. v. NLRB, 719 E2d 847
(6th Cir. 1983).
The Wright Line-Transp. Manage-
ment shifting-burdens doctrine simi-
larly controls analyses of section
158(b)(2) violations and discrimina-
tion because of employee concerted
activity arising in nonunion settings.
See Painters, Local 22 7 v. NLRB, 717
E2d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 1983) (section
158(b)(2) application); NLRB v. Val-
ley Plaza, Inc. (Captain Nemo's), 715
E2d 237, 244 (6th Cir. 1983); Mr.
Steak, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 553 (1983)
(Wright Line analysis used to find sec-
tion 158(a)(l) violation arising from
discharge or unorganized employee's
protesting working conditions).
Overt, direct evidence showing that
employee protected conduct was a
substantial or motivating factor in the
adverse action is not a prerequisite to
proving a prima facie case under sec-
tion 158(a)(3). Because such direct ev-
idence is "a rarity at best," the Board
may make credibility resolutions and
rely on circumstantial evidence to
draw reasonable inferences whether
an adverse action was impermissibly
motivated. See NLRB v. Brookwood
Furniture, 701 E2d 452, 464-65 (5th
Cir. 1983); see also NLRB v. Instru-
ment Corp. ofAm., 714 E2d 324, 328
(4th Cir. 1983).
Proving Employer Knowledge
Indispensable to proving unlawful
motive, however, is proving the em-
ployer's knowledge that the employee
subjected to an adverse action en-
gaged in protected conduct. When di-
rect evidence is unavailable, circum-
stantial evidence may suffice to
impute knowledge, for example,
when employees openly engage in the
protected conduct and "it strains...
credibility . . . to suppose that [em-
ployer] could have missed what was
going on under its nose." NLRB v.
Acme Die Casting Corp., 728 F2d
959, 961 (7th Cir. 1984), and when
"the smallness and openness of the
plant" makes it unlikely the protected
conduct would "remain secret."
NLRB v. Instrument Corp. of Am.,
714 E2d 324, 329 (4th Cir. 1983).
Moreover, a prima facie case requires
more than proof of knowledge, even
more than knowledge combined with
evidence of employer hostility to em-
ployees engaging in protected con-
duct. Id. at 328.
No exact calculus governs what ad-
ditional circumstantial evidence war-
rants an inference of unlawful motive.
The "garden variety" section 158(a)(3)
case involves employee discipline. The
General Counsel claims that an em-
ployee has been disciplined because of
protected conduct, and the employer
contends the discipline was imposed
for inefficiency, insubordination, or
other misconduct. See, e.g., Edward
G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F2d
86 (3d Cir. 1943). In these cases, after
knowledge has been proved, making a
prima facie case of unlawful motive
will usually require proof of one or
more of the following:
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* Background evidence of employer
hostility to employee protected con-
duct;
* Employee had a good work record;
" Employee had not been a good
worker, but employer condoned em-
ployee's conduct until the advent of
employee's protected activities;
e Employer has historically con-
doned alleged misconduct when en-
gaged in by other employees or disci-
plined others more leniently;
e Coincidence in time between disci-
pline and employee's protected activ-
ity;
9 Implausible, discredited, or shift-
ing reasons suggesting post hoc ra-
tionalization to clothe discriminatory
discipline in legitimacy; or
* Departure from established prac-
tice in administering discipline indica-
ting a cover for bad motive.
In assessing motive, an employer's
coercive statements, not protected by
section 158(c), are admissible but the
Board may not admit as evidence of
motive "unrelated, non-coercive ex-
pressions of opinion on union mat-
ters." See Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v.
NLRB, 180 E2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950),
aff'd as NLRB v. Pittsburgh Steam-
ship Co., 430 U.S. 498 (1951). See also
Indiana Metal Prod. Corp. v. NLRB,
202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953);
Darlington Mfg. Co., 165 N.L.R.B.
1074 n.7 (1967) (quoting legislative
history). Statements protected by sec-
tion 158(c) that would ordinarily be
deemed relevant and admissible in
courts of law may be introduced,
however, to show background, moti-
vation, or context. NLRB v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 418 F2d 736, 760 (2d Cir.
1969). See also Linn v. Plant Guard
Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 n.5 (1966)
(section 158(c) adopted to prevent
Board from attributing antiunion
motive to employer on the basis of
past statements).
B USINESS JUSTIFICATION * In the
course of a labor dispute, an em-
ployer may react to employees having
engaged in section 157 conduct by
taking responsive actions likely to af-
fect adversely protected employee in-
terests but explained by business justi-
fications. For example, an employer
in response to a lawful economic
strike may replace strikers to maintain
production or may grant supersenior-
ity to lure strikers back to work or to
attract striker replacements. Moreover,
in the face of a threatened strike or to
strengthen its bargaining position, the
employer may lock out employees. Or
in response to a strike that violates a
contractual no-strike pledge, the em-
ployer may discipline union leaders
more severely than other strikers be-
cause union officers breached a per-
ceived duty to uphold the contract. If
the methods of proof described in the
previous section enable the General
Counsel to make a prima facie case of
an intent to interfere with employees'
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protected rights, those methods, of
course, control the legal analysis.
As the Supreme Court has recog-
nized, however, these responsive
actions taken in the course of a labor
dispute may present "a possible com-
plex of motives" often making it "dif-
ficult to identify the true motive."
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,
460 U.S. 693, 701 (1983). Thus this
type of case presents the issue whether
the Board may draw inferences of un-
lawful motive by means other than
those described in the previous sec-
tion. The Supreme Court has wrestled
with this question in a series of cases
over almost a quarter century. The an-
swer and rationale have been clear for
some years; their full impact may
only now be emerging.
Specific Evidence Out-
weighs Business Justification
In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
373 U.S. 221 (1963), an employer had
extended a 20-year seniority credit to
strike replacements and strikers who
abandoned the strike and returned to
work. There was no evidence of sub-
jective intent to discriminate to dis-
courage concerted activities. The
court of appeals reversed the Board's
finding of a section 158(a)(3) viola-
tion, holding that, absent a finding of
a specific unlawful intent, a legitimate
business purpose is always a defense
to an unfair labor practice charge.
The Supreme Court, however, sus-
tained the Board's position, first stat-
ing that clearly "[w]hen specific evi-
dence of a subjective intent to dis-
criminate or to encourage or discour-
age union membership is shown, and
found... [c]onduct which on its face
appears to serve legitimate business
ends ... is wholly impeached .... "
Id. at 227-28. Furthermore, and more
significantly, even without specific ev-
idence of subjective intent, a violation
may be found by reason of the "inher-
ently discriminatory or destructive
nature of the conduct itself." Id. at
228. Relying on the Radio Officers'
rationale, the Court reasoned that the
employer in these cases must be held
to intend the natural consequences
that foreseeably and inescapably flow
from its actions.
After subsequently evaluating this
issue in several cases involving lock-
outs, the Court further developed its
Erie Resistor rationale in NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26
(1967). The employer had refused to
pay striking employees accrued vaca-
tion benefits during a strike, while
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making payment to employees replac-
ing strikers, nonstrikers, and strikers
who had returned to work. Disagree-
ing with the Board, the court of ap-
peals found no violation. Although the
employer had presented no evidence of
legitimate motive, the Board failed af-
firmatively to show an unlawful moti-
vation to discourage union member-
ship or to interfere with the exercise of
protected rights. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "once it has
been proved that the employer en-
gaged in discriminatory conduct,
which could have adversely affected
employee rights to some extent, the
burden is on the employer to establish
that he was motivated by legitimate
objectives since proof of motivation is
most accessible to him." Id. at 34 (em-
phasis in original). Since the General
Counsel had proved that the employ-
er's conduct carried the potential of
adverse effect upon employee rights
and the employer "simply did not
meet the burden of proof" of a proper
motive, the Board properly found a
violation of section 158(a)(3).
"Inherently Destructive"
Employer Action
Even more significantly, the Court
confirmed in dicta that if the em-
ployer does introduce evidence of "le-
gitimate and substantial business
justification," the Board may still find
a violation of section 158(a)(3), de-
pending on whether the Board rea-
sonably concludes the employer's
conduct is "inherently destructive" of
important employee rights or has a
"comparatively slight" adverse effect
on them. NLRB v. Great Dane Trail-
ers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967).
This distinction was reaffirmed and
explicated in Metropolitan Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 701 (1983)
(absent explicit contractual duty to
take affirmative steps to end unlawful
work stoppage, disparate punishment
of union officers when participating
in unlawful strike, because they fail to
take such affirmative steps, violates
section 158(a)(3) because "inherently
destructive" of protected employee in-
terests). As the Court reasoned in
Metropolitan Edison, conduct "inher-
ently destructive of employee inter-
ests" carries a strong inference of
impermissible motive. Hence even in
the face of employer evidence of legit-
imate and substantial business justifi-
cation, the Board "'may nevertheless
draw an inference of improper motive
from the conduct itself. . ."' Id. at 701
(quoting Great Dane Trailers). Wheth-
er drawing this inference in these cases
is appropriate depends on the Board's
exercise of "'its duty to strike the
proper balance between the asserted
business justifications and the inva-
sion of employee rights in light of the
Act and its policy.'" Id. In contrast, if
the adverse effect on employees of the
employer's conduct is "comparatively
slight," no inference of unlawful mo-
tive from the conduct itself is permis-
sible "'if the employer has come
forward with evidence of legitimate
and substantial business justifications
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for the conduct.'" Id. (emphasis in the
original). Then, no violation may be
found unless, through the methodol-
ogy discussed in the previous section,
the General Counsel proves by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the
employer's conduct was unlawfully
motivated.
As the Erie Resistor-Great Dane-
Metropolitan Edison analysis clearly
suggests, the definition of "inherently
destructive" conduct can be critical.
The only guidance offered by the Su-
preme Court is that conduct is "inher-
ently destructive" if it carries with it
'unavoidable consequences which the
employer not only foresaw but which
he must have intended' and thus bears
'its own indices of intent.'" NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26,
33 (1967) (quoting Erie Resistor). For-
mulated at such a high level of ab-
straction, this is not very helpful. Two
other articulations, widely used, are
more helpful:
* Conduct "'with far-reaching effects
which would hinder future bargain-
ing, or conduct which discriminated
solely on the basis of participating in
strikes or union activities.'" NLRB v.
Sherwin Williams Co., 714 F2d 1095,
1101 (11 th Cir. 1983) (adopting stan-
dard and citing approval in other cir-
cuits); or
* Conduct that "creates 'visible and
continuing obstacles' to the future ex-
ercise of employee rights." NLRB v.
Kaiser Steel Corp., 700 E2d 575, 577
(9th Cir. 1983).
Definitions aside, focusing on the
Supreme Court's reference in Metro-
politan Edison to the Board's "duty"
to strike a "proper balance" between
business necessity and coercive effects
on employee rights "in light of the Act
and its policy" may be the most realis-
tic guide. Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
NLBB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983). So
viewed, section 158(a)(3) analysis, in
some circumstances, enjoys a remark-
able similarity to section 158(a)(1)
analysis. But see Huck Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 693FE2d 1176, 1183-84&n.ll
(5th Cir. 1982) (sections 158(a)(1) and
158(a)(3) differ: The former requires
balancing of employer business neces-
sity and employee rights and the latter
a showing of unlawful motive or "in-
herently destructive" conduct).
Superseniority of Union Officers
Cases involving superseniority for
union officers provide a useful insight
into the operation of the "inherently
destructive" rule as a policy-making
device. After almost a decade of un-
certainty, in Gulton Electro- Voice,
Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 406, 409 (1983),
enforced sub nom. IUE, Local 900 v.
NLRB, 727 E2d 1184 (D.C. Cir.
1984), the Board held that collective
bargaining agreements granting su-
perseniority to union officers pre-
sumptively violate sections 158(a)(3)
and 158(b)(2) of the Code unless limi-
ted to:
9 Layoff and recall; and
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0 "Employees who, as agents of the
union, must be on the job to accom-
plish their duties directly related to ad-
ministering the collective-bargaining
agreement." Id. at 266 N.L.R.B. 409.
No proof of subjective intent to
discriminate to encourage or discour-
age union membership was proffered
or required because all superseniority
arrangements were seen as "inherently
discriminatory" and "at odds with
[section 157] of the Act." Id. at 408.
The Board's labeling all supersenior-
ity as inherently "at odds" with em-
ployee protected interests was critical.
More instructive, however, was the
decision to allow some "inherently
discriminatory" conduct, "[i]n consid-
eration of the underlying purpose of
the Act," while disallowing other su-
perseniority arrangements.
The Board had stated in an earlier
case that "the issue is ultimately one of
justification." Dairylea Coop., Inc.,
219 N.L.R.B. 656, 658 (1975), en-
forced sub non. NLRB v. Milk Drivers
& Dairy Employees Local 338, 531
E2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976). But "justifi-
cation," of course, is a question of
policy as Justice Holmes early recog-
nized. Vegelahn v. Guntner 167 Mass.
92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) (dissenting
opinion). See IUE, Local 900 v.
NLRB, 727 E2d 1184,1189 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Board's superseniority rule ul-
timately turns on "question of pol-
icy."); see also UAW Local 1384 v.
NLRB, 756 E2d 482 (7th Cir. 1985)
(reviewing and collecting cases). Ac-
cordingly, the Erie Resistor-Great
Dane Trailers-Metropolitan Edison
doctrine, refined over several decades
of litigation, stands as a potent tool
for shaping the contours of labor pol-
icy.
(To be continued)
Employer participation in efforts to repudiate a currently recognized
or certified union raise important free speech issues. The issue is de-
scribed well by the court in Texaco v. NLRB, 722 E2d 1226, 1231 (5th
Cir. 1984):
The employer must maintain complete neutrality of action, as con-
trasted with expression of views, in regard to its employees' decision to
become or remain unionized. Thus, an employer may not act by way
of preference, but may voice preference for a particular union or its
preference that the employees remain non-union . . . . Further, it is
equally clear that an employer may furnish information upon request
.... (emphasis in original)
- F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS
LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 87
(ALI-ABA, Philadelphia, 2d ed. 1986).
